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The Philosophical Foundations of Nineteenth-Century
German Jurisprudence: The Historical School
of Law and Legal Positivism
GERHARD

Dll..CHER

Since the Middle Ages, German jurisprudence has stood in the shadow of the legal
accomplishments of other European nations. The Italians founded medieval legal science
with the School of Bologna, which rediscovered the Corpus luris Civilis in the twelfth
century and completed its methodology. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the French
competed successfully with the ltalians and surpassed them with the development of a
modem, humanistic methodology, the Mos Gallicus. In the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries the Dutch broadened traditional jurisprudence to a natural and international lawthe name Hugo Grotius stands for this-and
to a modern, but historically founded
"elegant" jurisprudence. Since the seventeenth century there have been a number of great
German jurists, for example Samuel Pufendorf, and in the eighteenth century Germans
such as Christian Wolff took part in the development of a rational law of reason, which
formed the basis of later codifications of private law. German jurisprudence did not reach
an internationally leading position, however, until the ftrst half of the nineteenth century
with the founding of the Historical School, which is inseparably bound to the name of its
founder, Friedrich Carl von Savigny. Savigny's works have been internationally noted,
received and translated. Attention and influence were not limited to Savigny's work: the.
entire German legal science received throughout the nineteenth century until the First
World War international
consideration
and took up a leading position in legal
developments throughout Europe. Lines of influence can be traced in the Germanspeaking countries Austria and Switzerland, in Italy, France, England and Scandinavia.
The German Historical School of Law supplanted to a large extent the influence of the
French Ecole de I'Exegese, which was based on the great civil codiftcation, the Code civil
of 1804. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century
many countries, including Japan, China, Greece and Turkey, looked less to France as an
example than to the German Civil and Commercial Codes or their relatives, the Swiss
codifications. German law gained considerably on prestige in Europe through its
Historical School of Law, and the causes for this shall be examined in the following.
As a frame for the development of German Jurisprudence we must of course keep in
mind the political and constitutional conditions in Germany. These form a background,
not a basis, for nineteenth-century
German legal development. This was different in
France, .vhere politics and legal culture were more closely linked. In France, the
Revolution of 1789 eliminated the feudal system with a single blow and created a modem
nation-state which then under Napoleon proceedC',d to a comprehen~ive codiftcation. The
great codiftcations of the ftrst decades of the nineteenth century formed the basis from then
on for the development of legal culture in France.
In Germany the development was more gradual. The Holy Roman Empire of the
German Nation, essentially a creation of the Middle Ages, provided the political context
for German life until it broke apart in 1806 under the attach of revolutionary France. The
Holy RQman Empire of the German Nation had in its basic laws a constitutional frame,
with the Emperor, the Imperial Diet and, perhaps most importantly, the two highest
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imperial courts, the Imperial Cameral Tribunal and the Imperial Aulic Council, as
institutions of legal protection. Legal scholars at the universities interpreted and taught
the many different laws of the particular states, countries and cities, as well as Roman
law, which was the common law of the Empire. Especially the Gottingen University in
the Principality of Hanover developed in the late eighteenth century a legal science dealing
in a very exact historical analysis with Roman law, German private law and imperial
constltutionallaw.
The most important professors of the Gottingen School were Gustav
HugQ for Roman law and Stephan Putter for German law and imperial constitutional law.
I shall return later to this school of thought and its importance for the development of the
Historical School.
In Germany, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation broke apart under the
influence of the French Revolution and Napoleon in 1806 through the abdication of
Kaiser Franz II, but a revolution, then or later after the collapse of the Napoleonic rule
from 1813 to 1815, never took place. Instead, the princes of the German territorial states
initiated social and administrative reforms with the help of their burocrats, who were
legally educated noblemen or burghers. These reforms brought the Germans to the
conviction that a revolution with its devastating consequences was-superfluous. As early
as in the late eighteenth century, Prussia, which was next to Austria the leading German
state, introduced reforms of courts, procedure and legal education, as well as a
comprehensive legal codification, the Prussian Law Code of 1794. The Germans were of
the opinion, that their path to modem society and modem law did not lead through a
revolution, but through organic reforms. England was an example for the Germans of
such a development. The carriers of legal reforms were the princes, their ministers and
burocrats. however these princes were bound to the old aristocracy and consequently to the
feudal system. For this reason the danger was constant, that reforms projects would not be
carried through or would be swept aside in periods of restorative politics.
From decade to decade, however, the interest of the German bourgeois in the
continuation of reforms grew. These were developing at the same time into a new social
class. This class was not nearly as well defined as the French or English middle class,
particularly not in the economic sense. For German bourgeois, money, property and
economic strength· were less constituting factors than cultivated education and an
intellectual culture based on the classic German literature of the late eighteenth century,
particularly that of Leasing, Herder, Goethe and Schiller, and the humanitires, which were
intensively expanding since the turn of the century. This emerging bourgeoisie found its
class identity and consciousness as well as its political role in culture, education and
science. The class of burghers understood its political role as a party of progress, which as
we have seen was not a revolutionary, but an evolutionary organic progress, as the party
of liberalism as well as a factor of national unity in spite of the separation of Germany in
principalities,
which were bound together politically only loosely by the German
Confederation. The term "organic" characterizes this evolutionary historical principle.
The German Confederation,
which was included by the Austrian Chancellor
Mettemich at the Congress of Vienna in a European balance of power plan with the main
powers England, France, and Russia, achieved its purpose until the middle of the century,
to promote European peace and stability after the devastating Napoleonic wars. But
because of its losse political form it did not have the power to introduce uniform laws in
the states of the Confederation. This was a great impediment for economic development
and industrialization, which was just beginning in Germany. The law still contained
many rules and definitions from the feudal system which were of little use in a liberal
bourgeois society. The German bourgeoisie was interested in both legal unity and the
developing law of modem, liberal industrial society. This interest, along with the more
political questions of a constitution and the creation of a nation-state, grew among the
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Gennan bourgeoisie. These political demands became obvious in the Revolution of 1848
and in the first Gennan national parliament in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt in 1848 and
1849. They found their fulfilment in the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 under
Prussian rule and Bismarck's leadership. A unified law was created for the first time under
this Empire, crowned by the enactment of the Gennan Civil Code of the first of January
1900. Until then, Gennan legal scholarship was challenged with the task of unification
and modernization of all areas of private law. This great task and its fulfilment by Gennan
jurisprudence gained through its high quality international renown.
This closes the basic historical constellation. 1 shall now trace the founding
substance, method and theory which contributed to the fulfilment of this task.
Exactly this question of the formation of a future civil law for Gennany became the
subject of the most famous legal-political controversy of the Gennan language in 1814,
after the defeat of Napoleon and before the new German order of the Congress of Vienna.
In two legal pamphlets, which were read and discussed not only by jurists, but by a
broader educated bourgeois public as well, disputed two of the most well-known young
German professors. One, Thibaut, was from Western Germany near the French border and
• a law professor at the famous University of Heidelberg. The other, Savigny, was a
professor at the new university in the prussian capital Berlin, which was founded in 1810
based on the ideas of the humanistic reformer Wilhelm von Humboldt. Both authors
agreed, that in light of the political situation of several separate German states and the
legal needs of society a legal reforms was necessary. Their answers as to the vehicle and
the means of the reforms were however quite different. Thibaut criticized in his paper "On
the Necessity of a Civil Law for Germany" the existing legal condition of an nuclear
mixture of old Roman case law and German law. He saw the solution in the creation of a
Gennan national code, which could be written in two to four years on the basis of the
French Code civil. Such a code could provide regulation for the growing economic
relations as well as a basis for "Civil happiness". Thibaut's solution strikes one as being
modern. It could have founded an exegetic legal school similar to that of France, but failed
due to the lack of political backing from the German princes for a codification.
Very different was the solution presented by Savigny in his pamphlet, "On the
Vocation of Our Time for Legislation and Legal Scholarship", which advocates entrusting
legal scholarship with the task of legal reform. Savigny's proposal was politically more
realistic and his argumentation was more profound. He begins "On the Vocation of Our
Time" with a study of the beginnings of all law. "Law", he writes, "does not lead an
isolated existence, but forms an expression of all powers and activities of a particular
people and is as much a product of the people as language, customs and constitution. It
develops in an organic connection with the nature and character of the people." Savigny
and others later referred to this connection as being based on the "Volksgeist", the spirit
of a people. In this sense law for Savigny was "life itself, seen from a particular angle."
He goes on in the pamphlet to describe the evolution of law, as we would say in modern
terms. With the progress of culture the areas of activities specialize and with them
professions and their subjects. A class of jurists emerges, in whose hands law becomes a
science. Along with the connection to culture as the political element of law, law
develops through science a technical element. This legal technique can be administered
only by trained jurists.
In Germany and on the European Continent however-in contrast to England, whose
quite different development Savigny assessed positively-in
the very moment of legal
specialization Roman law was adopted. It represents the material of the activity of
European jurists necessarily, because the classic Roman jurists of Antiquity developed
legal technique and juristical terminology to a high state of perfection. Savigny compares
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this perfection of terms, rules and methods on the one hand to mathematics (jurisprudence
as "arithmetic of terms") on the other hand to the role of grammar as the normative frame
of a language. If therefore in Germany Roman law and not ancient German law was
developed further, then this was not a coincidence, buthad a deeper historical reason.
Savigny ignores the fact that Roman law did not stem from the Volksleben and
Volksgeist. For him the jurists are the legitimate organ of the people for the development
of law. Savigny did not examine this spelt between Volksleben and jurisprudence, and
because of this contradiction in his analysis he has been criticized on this point Here lies
the paradox between the foundation of law in the Volksleben and Volksgeist and
Savigny's specialists' dogma", that the jurist, without further legitimation than his
expertise, is authorized to form and develop the law. Because Savigny, who was
politically conservative, held a distance to democratic ideas and the constitutional
movement, he did not consider the participation of the people through parliamentary
representation.
From this point of view Savigny criticizes in "On the Vocation of Our Time" the
idea of codification in general. He attributes it to the rationalism of the eighteenth
century, the Age of Enlightenment, which wanted to rule by legal commands of the state.
This was for Savigny in contradiction to the organic correlation between law and the
"silently working forces" that change it. This constant organic change would have been
much better represented by a customary law, as carried out in earlier times by the people,
and in the modem era by jurists. Jurists for Savigny were only legal scholars, the leading
professors at the German universities like himself, a talented young nobleman--of the old
Reich. His version was therefore politically better founded than that of Thibaut. There
was no more uniform jurisdiction in Germany, which could have worked toward legal
development and unity. The German universities, however, did exist These were carried
and attended by the cultural unity of the educated burghers. When one views Savigny's .
origination theory of law and his manifesto for the development of law through science
from this angle, then one sees a call on the leading representatives of the educated
burghers in legal science, to develop a uniform and modem law for the German people.
This assignment was fulfilled by the German universities of the nineteenth century,
because the drafting of the German Civil Code and the other great codifications was
achieved less through parliamentary
debates than through qualified legislation
commissions, which transformed the textbooks of German professors into law form.
This work of German legal
alone, as in an exegetical school,
and methodological foundations
Savigny and were adopted by his
study.

scholarship was not possible through legaL technique
but through a profound consensus on the philosophical
of jurisprudence. These were developed above all by
school. This school shall be the subject of the following

Savigny himself referred to his approach as the founding of a Historical School, and
the name has remained until this day. Thibaut protested in vain that his view was called
unhistorioal. Historical was at the time a positive description, and Savigny was capable of
bringing it into connection with his teachnigs. That this term was well-founded, is proved
by the fact that Savigny propagated a tenet of development, of evolution of law with the
essential reason that law is capable of adapting to change in history. That is why he saw
law as a part of "life itself' and therefore of historically changing society.
The material and method of law were for Savigny historical. The material of Roman
law was a historical "given" for European jurisprudence, as collected in the Code of
Justinian in the 6th century A.D. and readapted by the Roman legal school of Bologna in
the twelfth century. He accepted as well the historical material of ancient German law,
which was developed in the Middle Ages and since then along with Roman law
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represented an important factor in German legallife--even though Savigny did not see the
same standard of perfection of organisation and technique in German law. Savigny's
method of ascertaining the meaning of a legal norm was historical as well. He purposely
did not use the science of the past era of the eighteenth century, but instead went back to
the birth date of the norm, the Antiquity of the classica1 Roman jurists. He sought the
meaning of a norm in its origins. This demanded a great measure of historica1 knowledge
on the one hand and a hermeneutical and methodical education on the other. Savigny
presupposed both for the scientifically educated jurists of his time and with them
extremely high standards, which corresponded however to the new scientific standards of
the nineteenth-century German academica1ly educated bourgeoisie. He placed the jurist in
particular in terms of education and science on the same level with the classica1 scholars
of Antiquity, which enjoyed high prestige in the period of Neohumanism in Germany,
but a1so with the philologians and theologians of the blossoming German universities.
He presumed a very different type of jurist than the purely school masterly educated law
student of the eighteenth century. Law for Savigny was part of the humanistic sciences,
as issued from the university reforms of Wilhelm von Humboldt in Prussia. This
harmony with the other humanities and the prestige they possessed among the educated
bourgeoisie, could not have been founded on the basis of an exegetical school. This
formed the main basis for the social status of the jurists of the German bourgeoisie and
for the agreement of the academics in the most important educational matters at the
universities. In this sense it was important for the unity of the middle class in general.
The jurisprudence Savigny foundyd was not based on the historica1 component a1one',
but as Savigny especia1ly in his early methodological teachings in 1804 expressed it, on a
philosophica1 component as well. This philosophica1 basis must not be forgotten because
it forms a main element in Savigny's legal conception and in his methodological work on
the draft of a new civil law , as elaborated in his great masterwork, "System des heutigen
Romischen Rechts" ("System of Contemporary Roma Law"). This philosoppical element
meant that Savigny did not simply reproduce Roman law, but created a means for its
organisation and reformation. What exactly did philosophica1 mean for Savigny and on
what philosophy did he lean?
In an early statement Savigny expressed the wish to become a Kant of jurisprudence.
Kant was however not the founder of Historism, of a historical school, but of a
systematica1 philosophy. In his ethics as in his legal theory, Kant places in, the centre of
his considerations the person and his claim to freedom, which finds its limit only in the
freedom of another, which is to be respected equally. The idea of the person and his
freedom was Savigny's systematica1 point of departure for the organisation of Roman law.
Roman law was well adapted for this, because the person of the Roman citizen (civis
romanus) is the initial point of its legal order. Savigny eliminated large sections of
Roman law which did not correspond to this principle, as seemed appropriate for the
nineteenth-century liberal bourgeois society. "The person and his will" were for him the
starting point of a legal order, and wi~h it the basic equality of the individual, free
expression of the will, contractual and testamentary freedom and transferability of
property. The development of a special feature of German civil law , the summarization of
general rules based on the person, his declarations of intention and the formation of
contracts stemmed from this approach. Savigny formulated in the frrst volume of his
"System of Contemporary Roman Law" general rules of civil law., at a level of
abstraction previously unknown by Roman law. They formed since then an officia1 part
of the German Roman civil law textbooks in the nineteenth century, were adopted in the
"General Section", the first book of the German Civil Code, and have been the subject of
German scienc.e and study to the present day, which for this reason allots particular
emphasis to the general principles of civil law. This tendency of German science toward
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the development of abstract principles, which then are adjusted by means of compromise
to particular legal problems, has been praised and criticized by scholars of other countries.
The transition from the division of civil law into the institutions of Justinian, "personae,
res, actiones", which the French Code civil still follows, to the division into five books,
"General Sections, Law of Obligations, Property, Family Law, Law of Succession",
which the German Civil Code follows, was initiated by the Roman law textbooks of the
Historical School. This is a more differentiated subdivision, which is functionally
oriented and allows sharper analytic divisions. The apparentness of connected legal rules is
however often broken up.
We have thus far seen in Savigny several to some extent contradictory working
methods and thoughts. Savigny can be seen under many different aspects, as a legal
historian of the Romantic period, as an empirically working hemeneut, and as a legal
dogmatist and systematist with broad legal and political influence. Savigny's concept of
the evolution of law is based on the term "Volk", "people", as founded by Herder and
developed in the Romantic period, on the idea that law originates in history rather than in
systematic, rationalistic natural law. This legal systematology seems to have been drawn
from Kant's freedom ethics and from the value system of bourgeois liberalism. While
Savigny rejects the systematic thinking of natural law and the law of reason, he praises
on the other hand the method and terminology of the Roman jurists and develops his own
system. Which influences and examples led him in doing so?
Savigny was interested since his youth in the many new movements in German
literature and philosophy and read contemporary classic German literature, especially
Goethe, as well as the philosophical Romantics such as the Brothers Schlegel. He had
friendly contract with young literary Romantics such as Achim von Arnim and the
Brentanos, with whom he was related through his marriage with Gunda Brentano. He
confidently took up his own role in the context of the modem neohumanistic founding of
the University of Berlin under the auspices of Wilhelm von Humbodt, and he followed, as
may be seen in remarks, reviews and letters, the development of a general and political
philosophy. These many references have found a large number of interpretations in the
scholarly literature on Savigny. This is why there is no unified opinion as to whether
Savigny's many different intellectual activities were disparate, only unified in the
personality of the jurist himself, or if these were "fragments of a great confession"
(Goethe) with a single philosophy at their base. A new and difficult-to-read book by the
young legal historian Joachim Ruckert reconstructs behind Savigny's many writings a
metaphysical world view with an objective and idealistic philosophy, which he persues to
the basic questions of morality and law, people and state and the construction of legal
terms. This would mean, that neither Kant's critical philosophy nor historism in the
sense of historical relativism forms the basis of Savigny's thought, but the understanding
of the meaning and essence of appearances, in which apparent contradictions disappear. In
this essence behind appearances and terms, Savigny finds the already mentioned
objectivity and truth. Savigny's obvious distance to Hegel and his school, as shows best
by the critique of the Hegel Scholar and Jurist Gans, would prove to be a competition
between two different ways of thought of an objective idealism; in any case Savigny's
thought has nothing to do with Hegel's dialectical development of reason in the course of
world history. Savigny's conception of objective truth is much more static, and thus he
finds a similar conception in the terminology of the Roman lawyers. The Hegel student
Karl Marx, who heard Savigny in Berlin, described Savigny's orientation on the classical
sources of legal science rather than on the present when he said, that Savigny wanted to
sail to the source and not on the sea.
Savigny stands as a jurist with a very broad literary and philosophical education as
well as a great legal talent as the founder of the Historical School of Law. From this
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flow the many different aspects of his work that compose its richness and
intellectual bre~dth moulds his language as well, which in many respects
Goethe's. It stands far above a legal jargon and was able to convince not
but the educated burgher as well, of the value and niveau of this legal
composed argumentation and many learned associations.

Important as well for the development of nineteenth-century legal science was another
branch of the Historical School. With Savigny, a member of the Gottingen School came
to Berlin as a professor of law, Karl Friedrich Eichhorn. Eichhorn worked together with
Savigny as a fellow founder of the Journal for Historical Jurisprudence of 1815, which
was a consequence of Savigny's "On the Vocation of Our Time for Legislation and Legal
Scholarship", and represented the programme of the school. Eichhorn was a Germanist, in
contrast to the Romanist Savigny, and as such a representative of German law. He also
developed a historical, dogmatic and formative view of law. Eichhorn lacked however
Savigny's philosophical basis. He remained an advocate of historical pragmatism, but
founded nonetheless a teaching tradition, which lies in the presentation of historical
development, the constitution and its legal sources in a textbook of German legal history,
and in the dogmatic construction of the figures of German law in a textbook of German
private law.
With the School of the Germanists, the scientific work on the German legal heritage
was included in the legal science of the Historical School along with Roman law. It was
not to be overlooked, that the work of the Germanists better coincided with the theory of
the "Volksgeist". Legal sources were studied here, from the earliest times of the Germanic
tribes to the present, which stemmed in a continuity from the social foundations of
German society and its development. The idea of law as a particular aspect of social life
and thus as historically submitted to change, could also be better pursued in German law
than in Roman, which was viewed more as the static tradition of a class of educated
jurists. German law differed from Roman law in its structures and basic principles as
well. German law is always associated with a certain group of people from which it
stems, often as it was discussed and written down in a meeting; in the older tribunal
representative bodies, in manors and towns, in cities and guilds, in the curia of the tenants
or in the councils of the estates of the old Reich or of the territorial states. The principle
of a community and its law, the connection of law to the social as well as political and_
constitutional relations is contained in the sources of German law, whereas Roman law is
abstracted from all this and focuses on individual, isolated legal conflicts. German law
tended more toward a politically and sociologically founded legal science, which is
sketched in Savigny's theoretical reasoning. In this sense the Germanists were a
legitimate branch of the Historical School and felt themselves as such. Jacob and
Wilhelm Grimm, law students of Savigny and his lifelong friends along with the
Romantics Brentano and von Amim, were not only occupied with folk tales, sayings,
mythology and philogy. Jakob Grimm remained in contact with law as a Germanist and
wrote "Rechtsaltertumer" ("Ancient legal, Monuments "), a classical work of legal history,
and edited "Weistumer", a collection of sources of village and folk law.
The legal Germanists necessarily had contact with the arising national movement and
tried to win this movement for German history and historiography, with which the
Germanists as legal and constitutional historians were personally and professionally
closely bound. The Germanists identified strongly with the political goals of bourgeois
liberalism through their interest in the old German freedom of participation of the people
in political decisions and legislation in the tribunals and folk meetings and in the
constitutions of the estates. This liberalism was "organically grown" German through its
development in history. The Romanists were less politically active and saw their task as
purely legal, in co-operation with legislation commissions. The Germanists, however,
NLSJ-7
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entered the political arena, often as political speakers and representatives in the diets of the
land, in Germanist Congresses of the prerevolutionary years 1846 and 1847 and in the
Frankfurt Parliament of the Revolution of 1848. They separated themselves, from
Savigny's rejection of a codification and demanded national legislation toward unity. Their
goal was a political solution to the legal development on the basis of the dogmatic and
political strivings of the legal scholars. From the middle of the century until the passing
of the Civil Code and beyond, a fruitful discussion between the Germanists and
Romanists flourished. The Germanist and later representative in the Frankfurt Parliament,
Georg Beseler, polemised in his book, "Law of the People and Law of the Jurists'\ in
1843 against the Savigny student Puchta ("Customary Law", 1828) and demands a greater
proximity of law and legislation to the people. The above-mentioned
Germanist
Congresses under the direction of Jacob Grimm demanded not only a parliamentary
legislation, but also juries and lay judges as in England. The last great nineteenth-century
Germanist, Otto von Gierke, criticized the strongly Roman tendencies in the Civil Code
and called for a more German language and thought. That the structures, values and
principles of German law are quite different from those of Roman law, is well shown by
Gierke's lectures and voluminous scientific works on the details of legal and political
formation and legal dogma. This call of the Germanists for a legal regulation for the
contemporary societal developments corresponded to that of the Historical School. The
Germanists possessed many rich materials in the areas of commercial, corporate,
securities, exchange, patent and mining law from German sources, especially from
medieval city laws. These legal materials were of great importance for the development of
law in a modem industrial society, but were scarcely present in Roman law. The method
of the Historical School provided tne opportunity to solve modem problems with l~gal
tools of the Middle Ages.
The Historical School of Law, founded by Savigny on the basis of the older
Gottingen School, and its two branches, the Romanists and the Germanists, spans a broad
area of Roman and German legal sources, which were worked out through historical,
hermeneutical and terminological, systematological
methods to solve arising legal
problems in the developing bourgeois industrial society. These sources were broader and
more differentiated, but also more difficult to work out than a codification, such as that of
the French Ecole de l'exegese and similar schools. The theoretical, methodological and
philosophical basis of the historical method was broad, profound and full of connections
to all the other developing sciences, but, in its breadth was full of contradictions as well.
My thesis is, that this breadth and contradiction was productive for German legal science
until the end of the century and beyond, although since the mid-century a methodological
narrowing took over in the form of legal positivism and conceptual jurisprudence. This
narrowing is represented by the works of the Savigny student Puchta, the great Romanist
Jhering in his earlier period, the Germanist Gerber and the constitutional jurist Laband.
This new development can only be shortly characterized here. L~al positivism and
conceptual jurisprudence removed the historical and sociological dimension from the legal
dogmatic work of the jurist; one consequence was the arisal of an independent science of
history of law instead of Savigny's proclaimed historical legal science, in which historical
and philosophical, systematological and terminological work was united. Under this new
stream of thought, the work of the jurist was understood mainly as dogmatic and
terminological. It won however through this limitation on constructive power and juristic
exactitude. This was the proclaimed goal of the legal positivism and conceptual
jurisprudence and corresponded to the rule of law, in which the citizen possesses the
greatest possible security over legal means and the judge is strictly held on the
interpretation of statutes. This narrowed conception of legal work is shown in the of tencited formulation of the great Romanist Wind scheid in his speech of 1864, "Ethical,
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political or economical questions are not the business of the jurist as such", that is, not

the duty of the jurist who applies the law, but that of the legislator who creates it. This
limitation of the duties of the jurist was universally accepted as progress toward greater
exactitude in legal method in late nineteenth-century German jurisprudence. However the
broader approach of the Historical School remained in many respects fruitful. The normal
jurist was freed of the task of having to combine dogmatic, historical and philosophical
work. The leading minds in legal science transferred this task to other differentiated areas
in light of the new problems of a fully developed, national German bourgeois society, and
the leading minds in legal science consisted not only of elite law professors, but of judges
of high courts, members of legislation commissions and high ministerial burocrats. The
original concept of the Historical School, which was to combine law with history and
philosophy in a single education, which would have enabled juri~ts to structure law in the
future, remained the tenet of this elite group and brought German legislation, legal and
cultural politics around 1900 to a zenith, which was seen as an international example by
many.
The span of this development shall be traced briefly here through a number of great
names. Rudolf von Jhering led the conceptual method to a pinnacle and analysed with
great exactitude its basis on historical experience and the benefits of exact terminology.
He superceded however in his later work conceptual jurisprudence,
criticized its
shortcomings and pursued instead a realistic analysis of legal interests, which opened the
path to a jurisprudence of interests as well as to the sociological method of the future.
Scholarly research has well shown, that Jhering's concept of law in its sociological
foundation and in the connection between interest and law resembles closely that of Karl
Marx. The previously mentioned Germanist Otto von Gierke criticized legal positivism in
constitutional law as a negation of the political dimension and political theory beyond the
constitution. Gierke emphasized in his critique of codification the importance in private
law of an ethical, sociological and legal-political analysis and underlined the limited
ability of Roman legal institutions to solve modem problems. The legal institutions he
developed on the basis of ancient German law were broader and closer to the needs of
contemporary society than the Roman institutions. Gierke's institutions have influenced
greatly the legal developments of the twentieth century in private law and labour law. His
theory of corporations was a cornerstone in the political concept of pluralistic society.
Theodor Mommsen, a young scholar active in the Revolution of 1848, edited the
publication of the Corpus luris Civilis and organised scientific projects on the level of
government-sponsored
projects and institutes. In doing so, he created for Wilhelmine
Germany an example of modem scientific planning and organisation, which was of
particular importance in the sciences. At the same time he helped form the consciousness
of the educated burghers through literary achievements such as his Roman public law and
his Roman history, which brought him the Nobel prize for literature. In closing, I would
.like to mention Max Weber, who as student of Mommsen and a true pupil of the
Historical School began his studies with works on Roman legal history, commercial law
of the Middle Ages and historical empirical research on the Prussian agrarian constitution
in support of reform legislation. On this basis he went on to found the sociology of law,
a theoretically based national economic theory, political science and a modem theory of
science.
In this analysis, I have concentrated my view on the German development and
have neglected international relations, which consist of a constant give and take. My
in doing so was to show, that the unique challenge of a difficult national situation
answered by an interdisciplinary expansion of legal science and that this expansion
fruitful implications not only for the legal development itself, but for the sciences
whole and for the status and influence of German lawyers.

thus
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as a
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